Patterns of civil society after authoritarianism: a comparison of Portugal and Spain, 1970s-2000s. CES Papers - Open Forum #17, 2013-2014 by Fernandes, Tiago
ces papers - open forum
2013-2014
CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
T H E  M I N D A  D E  G U N Z B U R G
A T  H A R V A R D  U N I V E R S I T Y
Patterns of civil society after 
authoritarianism: a comparison of 
portugal and spain, 1970s-2000s
Professor Tiago Fernandes
CES-
ces papers - open forum # 17
Open Forum CES Paper Series
The Series is designed to present work in progress by current and former Center affiliates and 
papers presented at Center’s seminars and conferences. Any opinions expressed in the papers 
are those of the authors, and not of CES.
  
Editors:
Grzegorz Ekiert and Andrew Martin 
Editorial Board:
Philippe Aghion
Peter Hall
Roberto Foa
Alison Frank Johnson
Torben Iverson
Maya Jasanoff
Jytte Klausen
Michele Lamont
Mary Lewis
Michael Rosen
Vivien Schmidt
Kathleen Thelen
Daniel Ziblatt
Kathrin Zippel
ABSTRACT
1ces papers - open forum # 17
In this paper we argue that patterns of civil society in post-authoritarian democracies are the result of divergent 
pathways to democracy. Through a comparison of contemporary Portugal (social revolution) and Spain (reform), 
we show that revolutionary pathways to democracy have a positive impact on the self-organizing abilities of 
popular groups, thus also contributing to a higher quality of democracy. There are three mechanisms in social 
revolutionary processes that contribute to this. The first stems from the fact that the masses are the key actor in the 
revolutionary transformation process, with the power to shape (at least partially) the new rules and institutions of 
the emerging democratic regime. This results in greater legal recognition and institutional embeddedness between 
civil society organizations and the state, making it easier, in turn, for resources to be transferred to those organiza-
tions. Secondly, as a result of changes to the social and economic structure, revolutions engender more egalitarian 
societies. Likewise, citizens are given more resources and capacities for collective action. Finally, revolutions 
tend to crystalize a political culture between elites and the masses in which the principles of egalitarian partici-
pation and social change through the action of the people are accepted. This all leads to greater opportunities, 
resources and legitimacy for the civic action of the common people during the subsequent democratic regime.
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Patterns of Civil Society after       
Authoritarianism:
A Comparison of Portugal and Spain, 
1970’s-2000’s
1. Introduction
The relationship between civil society and democ-
racy is one of the founding themes of contemporary 
social science. Although it has not always been the 
case that a strong and developed civil society aids the 
consolidation of democratic regimes (Berman, 1997; 
Riley, 2010; Varshney, 2002), it is nonetheless also 
true that, at least since Tocqueville, many positive 
correlations have been noted (Tocqueville, 1994). 
There are numerous ways in which civil society may 
contribute towards democracy: the organization of 
and public competition between interests; the capac-
ity to make government actions more accountable; 
the establishment of bonds of trust between citizens; 
and the enabling of a more inclusive, rational and de-
liberative public debate (Alagappa, 2004; Fishman, 
2004; Fung, 2003; Habermas, 1989; Janoski, 1988; 
Putnam, 1993; Schmitter, 1996; Warren, 2001). 
 Nonetheless, as important as these factors 
may be, they are not sufficient to engender a higher 
quality democracy. If we accept the notion that the 
essential principle of a democratic society is politi-
cal equality – the possibility for all groups and in-
dividuals to have the same opportunity to express 
their interests in the public arena and for these to 
have equal consideration on the part of the authori-
ties – then the role of civil society must be evalu-
ated accordingly. The quality of democracy is thus 
increased insofar as inequalities in voice, participa-
tion and organization of the social groups with the 
least resources are reduced (Dahl, 1982; Heller, 1996 
and 2000; Rueschemeyer, 2005). In mass democra-
cies and in complex societies, beset by wide struc-
tural inequalities based on income, wealth, gender, 
race or religion, only through the capacity for col-
lective organization can the interests of the com-
mon citizen and of those with the least resources 
– of those generally called the middle and working 
classes – be protected. From this standpoint, the ex-
istence of strong mass organizations (e.g.: unions, 
cooperative movements, professional associations, 
women’s movements) that will represent the poor, 
the excluded, and unorganized majorities is essen-
tial to ensure that these groups are represented in a 
democratic regime (Collier and Handlin, 2009; Dahl, 
2006; Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1997, 
pp. 324-328; Oxhorn, 2011; Roberts, 1998; Skocpol, 
2003; Tilly, 2004, pp. 14-16; Tilly, 2007, p. 110). 
 This is even more important in post-authori-
tarian democracies, created in the wake of highly in-
stitutionalized, exclusionary and repressive dictato-
rial regimes. This includes not only countries which 
are “Third Wave” democratizers (1970s-1990s), 
such as the more recent democracies in Southern 
Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia, 
but also the democracies that followed World War 
II, such as Japan and Germany. All these societies 
are historically distinguished by high levels of eco-
nomic, social and political inequality (Bernhard and 
Karakoc, 2007; Huber and Safford, 1995; Huber and 
Stephens, 2012; Karakoc, 2013; Mouzelis, 1995; 
Stepan, 1986; Ziblatt, 2008 and 2009).  And, indeed, 
it is also in many of these societies that civil societies 
are weakest (Alagappa, 2004, p. 39; Howard 2002, 
158; McDonough, Shin, Moisés, 1998, p. 922).
 The causes for such demobilization are 
known. Police repression and political exclusion dur-
ing the dictatorships made the creation of vast mass 
organizations very difficult outside the structures 
condoned by the regime. At best, only apolitical and 
local associations were allowed. Attempts to create 
wide collective organizations at the national scale, 
such as unions, met with such police and administra-
tive obstacles and hindrances that they could only 
survive by creating clandestine informal support net-
works – which reinforced the localism of these orga-
nizations. After the transition, organizations that had 
appeared to be strong and able to mobilize at the na-
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divergent pathways to democracy, social revolu-
tion in Portugal and reform in Spain. Although there 
has been much research on the relationship between 
modes of transition from authoritarianism and demo-
cratic consolidation (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998; Karl, 
1990; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 
1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Collier, 1999; 
Tarrow, 1995), far less is known about the effects 
of political transitions on the quality of democra-
cies (but see Almeida, Branco, Fernandes, 2012; 
Anderson, 2010; Fishman 2010 and 2011; Schmit-
ter, 1995). Specifically, we argue that a revolutionary 
pathway to democracy (Portugal) had a positive im-
pact on the self-organizing abilities of working and 
middle-class groups, thus contributing to a higher 
quality of democracy. Social revolutions do not al-
ways lead to democratic regimes (on the causes of 
this variability see Slater, 2009). But they tend to 
institutionalize mechanisms that stimulate mass 
political and civic participation (Skocpol, 1997). 
Thus, democracies born of a revolutionary process 
tend to provide more opportunities and mechanisms 
for participation and civic inclusion of the masses 
in the political life of the nation (Anderson, 2010). 
 There are three mechanisms in social revo-
lutionary processes that contribute to this effect. 
The first stems from the fact that the masses are the 
key actor in the revolutionary transformation pro-
cess, with the power to shape (at least partially) the 
new rules and institutions of the emerging demo-
cratic regime. This results in greater legal recogni-
tion and institutional embeddedness between civil 
society organizations and the state, making it easier, 
in turn, for resources to be transferred to those or-
ganizations. Secondly, as a result of changes to the 
social and economic structure, revolutions engen-
der more egalitarian societies. Likewise, citizens are 
given more resources and capacities for collective 
action. Finally, revolutions tend to crystalize a po-
litical culture between elites and the masses in which 
the principles of egalitarian participation and social 
change through the action of the people are accept-
ed. This all leads to greater opportunities, resources 
and legitimacy for the civic action of the common 
tional scale proved much weaker; shortly thereafter, 
they found it tremendously difficult to gather resourc-
es and to recruit and mobilize members to maintain 
national structures (Fishman, 1990; Oxhorn, 1995). 
 In addition, a civic culture of generalized sus-
picion, inherited from the authoritarian period, ham-
pered the creation of horizontal and egalitarian ties 
between citizens and between different social groups 
and/or classes. The dictatorships also stimulated mis-
trust among individuals, as well as isolation and the 
feeling that only family and very close friends could 
be relied upon, making it that much more difficult 
to create collective enterprises which presupposed 
the establishment of ties between individuals from 
different social groups (Kubik, 2000). The aver-
sion to associativism that can be found in many of 
the new democracies also stems from the fact that, 
during the authoritarian period, citizens were sub-
ject to compulsory enrollment in the regime’s own 
associations. The experience of forcible enrollment 
in youth, labor or leisure organizations led to a sense 
that association was, above all, a means of con-
trol and repression (Schmitter, 1999a; Linz, 1975, 
pp. 306–310; for Latin American authoritarian re-
gimes see O’Donnell, 1973, p. 49; Oxhorn, 1995a, 
pp. 257–58; Stepan, 1978, p. 112; Howard, 2002).
 However, such hypotheses fail to explain 
variations in the development of a civil society repre-
sentative of the middle and working classes present 
in post-authoritarian democracies. Focusing on the 
Portuguese and Spanish cases, we see how, despite 
countless similarities concerning political culture, 
type of previous non-democratic regime, timing and 
context of the transition, and duration of the demo-
cratic period, the civil societies formed in these coun-
tries during the democratic period (1970s-2000s) are 
radically different. Portuguese civil society became, 
in most kinds and fields of organizations (both social 
and political), more dense, institutionalized and orga-
nized. The model of civil society present in Portugal 
is much closer to the ideal of participatory democ-
racy, whereas Spain has a much more demobilized 
civil society. What can explain these differences?
 We argue that they are the result of highly 
ces papers - open forum # 17 4
people during the subsequent democratic regime.
 In a reformist pathway (Spain), however, 
not only is the regime change driven by the elites 
within the regime’s structures, but these elites seek 
only purely political change in regime, giving no 
consideration to the democratization of the social 
and economic spheres (e.g. through the redistribu-
tion of agricultural property). This pathway is less 
auspicious for the consolidation of a strong civil 
society. First, social structures inherited from the 
former regime linger on, adapted to democratic in-
stitutions, but nonetheless oligarchic and egalitar-
ian. Indeed, it is common in such circumstances, for 
clientelistic networks which reinforce the power of 
traditional elites to be expanded and democratized. 
Secondly, the new regime’s institutions tend to func-
tion (e.g. adopting and implementing public policies) 
in a manner that is closed off from civil society. The 
legislation on civil society tends to be less liberal 
and public policy processes tend to be conducted 
separately, absent consultation and partnerships with 
civil society institutions. Finally, there is often a 
lasting culture of hierarchy and deference between 
government and citizens and between the elites and 
the common people. In essence, the authoritarian re-
gime’s institutional and cultural characteristics tend 
to remain, which, in time, results in fewer resources 
and opportunities for the expansion of a civil society 
that can represent working and middle class sectors.
 We also propose a new typology of pathways 
to democracy. Although there are numerous typolo-
gies for transitions from authoritarianism, we believe 
they are insufficient when it comes to analyzing the 
relationship between the process of regime change 
and the quality of the democracy it engenders. Most 
focus on the classification of the manner in which 
the dictatorships ended or on their impact on the pos-
sibility of democratic consolidation of the emerging 
regime (for a critical evaluation see McGuire, 1995, 
pp. 194-195). The existing conceptual schemes 
concerning modes of transition are, in fact, equally 
applicable both to regimes that moved towards de-
mocracy and to those that took on new forms of 
authoritarianism. But they have not been defined in 
terms of the quality of democracy. The conceptual 
map of modes of transition must be adapted to this 
issue. Thus, the universe of comparison must be lim-
ited to consolidated democracies, since it is to them
alone that the issue of democratic quality applies. If 
one’s aim is to analyze the quality of democracy, it 
makes more sense to speak in terms of pathways to 
democracy than transitions from authoritarianism.
 To this end, we propose four ideal-types 
of pathways to democracy: reform (when the re-
gime’s power elites introduce institutional changes 
towards democracy); rebellion (pressure on the 
part of popular actors in civil society leads to the 
introduction of political and institutional changes 
which lead to the regime change); revolution from 
above (the power elites in the previous con-demo-
cratic context guide the regime transition and in-
troduce both institutional and social and economic 
changes towards greater democratization); and so-
cial revolution (pressure from the popular actors in 
civil society leads to democratization, not only in 
the political and institutional structures, but also to 
democratizing changes in society and economy).
2. Patterns of Civil Society in Portugal and 
Spain, 1960s-2000s
 With the transition to democracy in the 
mid-1970s, Portugal and Spain both entered, for 
the first time in their history, into a period of lasting 
consolidated civic and associational freedom.  
During each regime’s final years, but especially 
during the years of transition, internal transforma-
tions and the process of deconsolidation and col-
lapse of the authoritarian regimes created a unique 
opportunity for the spontaneous mobilization of the 
common people and for the establishment of civic 
and associational freedoms. The years of transition 
in both countries showed high levels of participa-
tion, a wave of associational formation, the birth of 
social movements and the generalization of protest. 
They were also marked by high democratic hopes, 
with widespread sharing by popular actors of ideals 
and proposals of equalitarian and participatory de-
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mocracy (Barreto, 1987; Bermeo, 1986; Branco and 
Fernandes, 2012; Cerezales, 2003; Ferreira, 1994; 
Fishman, 1990a and 2011; Graham and Wheeler, 
1983; McDonough, Pina, Barnes, 1981; Muñoz, 
2000; Pérez-Díaz, 1993; Prata, 1997; Radcliff, 
2005a and 2005b; Pinto, 2008; Schmitter, 1995). 
 During the democratic period, however, the 
patterns of civil society and civic participation that 
arose in each country were rather different. By near-
ly all quantitative and qualitative measures of civil 
society, Portugal evinced a denser, more egalitarian 
and more institutionalized popular associativism, 
on the political as on the social and cultural levels, 
than Spain. Most reports show that both affiliation 
and participation in voluntary associations tends to 
be higher in Portugal. In comparison with Spain, 
Portugal approached a mass civil society pattern. 
Regarding one first measure – the percentage of the 
population enrolled in voluntary associations – Por-
tugal has been, according to most national and inter-
national surveys, always ahead of Spain. According 
to the 1990 World Values Survey, 76.5 percent of 
Spanish citizens were not affiliated with any orga-
nization, while the same was true of only 64.2 per-
cent of the Portuguese population. Laura Ulzurrum’s 
surveys also showed that the Portuguese have had a 
higher rate of enrollment: in 1987, it was 30.6 per-
cent in Portugal and 19.1 percent percent in Spain; 
in 1993, 35.9 percent to Spain’s 22.3 percent (Ul-
zurrum, 2004, p. 425). Adult enrollment in multiple 
organizations has also been higher in Portugal: in the 
early 1990s, 43.6 percent of adults were members of 
more than one association, while in Spain the number 
was only 31.2 percent (Ulzurrum, 2001, pp.14-15).
 During the period of 1999-2002, Portugal 
and Spain showed, according to Morales and Mota, 
practically equal levels of enrollment in associa-
tions (43 percent and 42 percent, respectively). But 
the Portuguese were far more dedicated to partici-
pating in theirs (58 percent and 49 percent, respec-
tively) (Morales and Mota, 2006, p. 80). Indeed, this 
has been true of the whole of the democratic peri-
od. In 1990, the percentage of members of associa-
tions that did volunteer work was higher in Portugal 
in activities (34 percent and 32 percent), donations 
(35 percent and 23 percent) and volunteer work (22 
percent and 16 percent) (Morales and Mota, 2006, 
p. 80). The trend continued in 2006, for an entire 
range of activities: participating in decisions and 
debates (57 percent and 40 percent), organizing and 
leading of meetings (25 percent and 14 percent), 
making public presentations (17 percent and 12 per-
cent) and elaborating documents (16 percent and 15 
percent) (Anduiza, Bonet, Morales, 2006, p. 270). 
 In Portugal, all kinds of working and mid-
dle class organizations, both social and political, 
have been stronger and denser. Altough the Por-
tuguese data for 1978 and 1984 refers both to af-
filiation and active participation (Bacalhau, Bru-
neau, 1978; 1984: Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984) 
– which may inflate the strength of civil society 
when compared to Spain – most other surveys 
which measure membership and participation 
separately always put Portugal ahead of Spain. 
 Union density, for instance, is historically 
much greater in Portugal: 61 percent of the active 
population in 1975, while Spain in 1978 had only 
0.9 percent. In 1990, the Spanish percentage had 
grown to 18 percent, while the Portuguese held at 
32 percent. In 2000, the rate was 25.6 percent in 
Portugal (Royo 2002, pp. 152-153), while three 
years earlier in Spain it was 17 percent (Pérez-Díaz, 
2000, p. 15). Concurrently, the adult population’s 
rate of enrollment in unions is higher in Portugal: in 
1978 and 1984, it was 31 percent and 12.9 percent, 
respectively (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; Bruneau, 
T., McLeod, 1984); in Spain, in 1980 and 1985, it 
was 9 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively (Mo-
rales, Mota, 2006, p. 85). And in 2000, the enroll-
ment levels were at 11 percent for Portugal and 7 
percent for Spain (Villaverde Cabral, 2000, p. 136).
 Affiliation and involvement in sports and 
leisure associations has also been higher in Por-
tugal. For the early decades of democracy, it was 
39.7 percent in 1978 in Portugal and 14 percent in 
Spain in 1980; and 50.4 percent in 1984 in Portugal 
and 10 percent in Spain (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; 
1984: Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984; Morales, Mota, 
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countries, the differing trend reappears in the 2000s, 
with a stronger civil society in Portugal. As Viegas 
and Santos show, during the period 2001-2008, Por-
tugal has higher enrollment rates in cultural, social 
assistance, religious, sports, parents, and residents 
associations (Viegas and Santos, 2010, p. 123). 
 This is especially intriguing, since through-
out the 19th and 20th centuries, Portugal’s civil so-
ciety was always less developed than Spain’s. In 
Portugal and Spain the strength of civil society be-
fore and after democratization is not positively cor-
related.  In Spain, between the World Wars (1933), 
there was one association for 1,556 citizens. In 
Portugal (1934), there was one for 6,436 (data on 
voluntary associations in Spain comes from Riley, 
2010, p. 85; for Portugal see Martins, 1998, p. 94 
and Schmitter, 1999a, p. 115; population levels for 
Spain come from Shubert, 1999, p. 41, and for Por-
tugal from Cascão, 1993, p. 425). The same differ-
ence between the two countries can also be noted for 
the last years of the dictatorships. A survey taken in 
Portugal in 1973 showed that only 1 percent of the 
population believed that organizing a formal group 
was a worthwhile way to influence the government 
(IPOPE, 1973, p. 94). Moreover, although working 
classes suffered mandatory affiliation in the official 
unions (sindicatos), the formation of corporatist or-
ganizations was a slow process. Many parishes (freg-
uesias) simply lacked these institutions. In 1967, 
thirty-four years after the foundation of the authori-
tarian regime, 70 percent of the parishes did not have 
Casas do Povo (Bermeo, 1986, pp. 18–20). Portugal 
was considered a desert of voluntary associations.
 Inversely, in Spain there was a wave of as-
sociational formation since late 1960s. Many were 
actively sponsored by the regime, like local asso-
ciations of cabezas de familia (heads of household) 
and amas de casa (housewives). In 1976, there 
were more than 4,000 of these local family asso-
ciations (Radcliff, 2005b, pp. 11–15). The Church 
supported associations, too, especially to counter-
act the hardliners of the regime. Finally, starting 
in the late 1960s, workers’ and urban social move-
ments grew enormously and showed very high ca
2006, p. 85). According to the 1990 World Values 
Survey, 5.3 percent of Spaniards and 13.6 percent 
of Portuguese were members of such organizations 
(WVS, 1990). For the years 2001-2003, the percent-
age remained higher in Portugal (8.2 percent) than in 
Spain (1.5 percent) (Viegas and Santos, 2010, p. 127).
Cultural associations also found it easier to recruit 
and mobilize people for their activities in Portugal 
(14.5 percent in 1978 and 22.1 percent in 1984) 
than in Spain (5 percent in 1980 and 9 percent in 
1985) (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; 1984: Bruneau, T., 
McLeod, 1984; Morales, Mota, 2006, p. 85). Dur-
ing the 1990s, the membership rates were lower, but 
the trend remained: 7.5 percent for Portugal and 5.1 
percent for Spain. Membership in professional orga-
nizations was also higher in Portugal throughout the 
democratic period: 6.2 percent in 1978, 10.2 percent 
in 1984, and 7 percent in the early 2000s. In Spain, 
the figures were as follows: 3.8 percent in 1980, 5 
percent in 1985, 2.6 percent in 1990 and 3.5 percent 
in the early 2000s (Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978; 1984: 
Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984; Delicado, 2003, p. 235)
 Finally, religious associations also gained 
more ground in Portugal. In the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s, 4.4 percent, 5.7 percent and 10.5 percent of 
the Portuguese population were members or par-
ticipated in such organizations, while in Spain, the 
number enrolled amounted to just 3 percent (1980), 
7 percent (1985) and 5.1 percent (1990) (Bacalhau, 
Bruneau, 1978; 1984: Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984; 
Morales, Mota, 2006, p. 85; World Values Survey, 
1990). And for the period 2001-2003, Portugal was 
also far ahead of Spain: 8.9 percent and 3.2 per-
cent, respectively (Viegas and Santos, 2010, p. 127). 
 In brief, throughout most of the democrat-
ic period, Portugal presents a civil society that is 
more representative of the interests of the working 
and middle strata, and, at both the social and politi-
cal level, far denser and stronger than Spain’s. This 
conclusion is concurrent with that of Ulzurrum, who 
also found greater levels of enrollment in social and 
political associations in Portugal (Ulzurrum, 2001, 
pp. 18-20). And, although the 1999 World Values 
Survey data indicates a convergence between the 
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3. Pathways to Democracy: a Framework for 
Analysis
 In the literature on democratization, the peri-
od of transition from authoritarianism has been given 
an enormous role as an explanatory factor in the pos-
sibility of consolidation of democracy (Karl, 1990, p. 
277). Although scholars have argued that other fac-
tors besides the transition also shape the emerging 
democracy, there seems to be a consensus that the 
way transitions unfold will always exert some influ-
ence in the type and characteristics of the new de-
mocracies (Aguero, 1998, p. 391; Bratton and van de 
Walle, 1998, p. 10; Cesarini and Hite, 2004, p. 328; 
Di Palma, 1990, p. 123; Glenn, 2001, p. 193; Munck 
and Leff, 1999, p. 195; Przeworski, 1991). Since the 
main trait of the transition period is political uncer-
tainty and fluidity about rules and institutions, the 
way these are settled and created will have major 
consequences for the future working of democracy, 
namely, by determining which groups will have priv-
ileged access to power and resources (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986, p. 6; Shain and Linz, 1995, p. 7). 
 The first theories on this issue focused, above 
all, on whether the transition would lead to a con-
solidated democracy or back to authoritarianism, ei-
ther in some new form, or through the return to the 
previous non-democratic order. The main obstacles 
to the consolidation of democracy were the previous 
regime’s more conservative factions, or hardliners, 
and the members of the state’s repressive apparatus 
(the police and armed forces), who could, at any giv-
en moment, reverse the process of democratization. 
Thus, to keep these groups under control, allow them 
power of decision, and ensure that their interests and 
position would not be greatly affected were essential 
tasks for the democratizing coalitions. Most of all, 
it was crucial that these groups did not feel threat-
ened by excessive popular pressures and demands 
(of redistribution; of political and civic rights; and 
especially of transitional justice) during the process
pacity for mobilization (Castells, 1983; Fishman, 
1990). Whereas in Portugal worker and urban 
protest was quite quiescent, in Spain 1,500,000 
hours were lost to strikes in 1966 alone and 
14,500,000 in 1975 (Maravall and Santama-
ría, 1986, p. 77). Moreover, the Spanish regime 
was more pluralistic than the Portuguese, with a 
sharper ideological differentiation and competition 
between factions and organized groups in the re-
gime (especially the Catholics and the Falangists), 
which since the late 1960s, actively sponsored civil 
society organizations as a strategy for achieving 
power and influence in society and in the regime 
(Linz, 1964 and 1973; Tusell, 1996, pp. 193, 278). 
 Recent research on the development of civil 
society in the recent democracies of central and 
Eastern Europe has highlighted the effect of legacies 
from the distant past. Ekiert and Foa, for instance, 
argue that whether new democracies in this area 
during the 19th century were part of the Russian or 
Habsburg empires explains differences found today. 
Those countries which belonged to the Habsburg 
Empire have a denser and more participative civil 
society, and a civic culture that is far more liberal 
than the countries formerly integrated in the Russian 
empire (Ekiert and Foa, 2010). However, the level 
of comparison used by the authors is that of areas, 
rather than countries, which, since several countries 
are aggregated in each geographical area, makes it 
difficult to know if a comparison between countries 
within the same geographical area could lead to 
some other interpretation, in which the type of path-
way to democracy might take on a different role. 
 In short, levels of development of associa-
tional life before and during the authoritarian pe-
riod cannot explain the current differences between 
the two countries, since they were always higher in 
Spain. And the differences that place Portugal ahead 
of Spain begin to show from the 1970s on, during 
and after the transition from an authoritarian regime 
to a democratic one. I argue that different pathways 
to democracy, social revolution in Portugal, and re-
form in Spain, produced these different outcomes. 
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regime’s elites negotiated the terms of the new 
regime with the democratic and moderate oppo-
sition, but in which popular participation was ei-
ther kept at low levels or ignored. Bargains and 
pacts between elites were decisive for the sur-
vival of democracy (Encarnacion, 2003; Karl 
and Schmitter, 1991; Munck and Leff, 1997, p. 
347; Haggard and Kaufman, 1999, p. 75; for a 
revision, see Valenzuela, 2011). Masses could 
be mobilized, if at all, only in crucial moments 
of the transition, just momentarily to reinforce 
the pro-democracy coalition (Valenzuela, 1989).
 The first typologies of transition were de-
signed to capture precisely these dynamics. Grant-
ed, Karl also reflected on the quality of these new 
democracies, when she argued that, although pacts 
among elites were essential for democratic con-
solidation, the price of such a transition would be 
collusion between elites and a scarcely competitive 
regime, in which political inequality and corruption 
would tend to prosper (Karl, 1990). All success-
ful new democracies would have to pay the cost of 
low quality in order to consolidate. However, this 
approach presented some problems when applied 
to the study of the quality of democratic regimes, 
as it failed to take into account the possibility of 
variations in quality or depth of new democracies. 
 In fact, a considerable body of research shows 
that, in new democracies, there is a great deal of vari-
ation in several dimensions of democratic quality: 
types of welfare-state, levels of corruption, parlia-
mentary powers, accountability, human rights, par-
ticipatory governance and development of civil soci-
ety (Alagappa, 2004; Anderson, 2010; Ekiert, 2003; 
Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998; Huber and Stephens, 
2012; Mainwaring and Scully, 2010; O’Donnell, 
2007; Ekiert and Hanson, 2003). Yet, using the 
old models, one cannot explain these variations. 
 Furthermore, research has shown that not 
only can mass based transitions help to consolidate 
democracies (McFaul, 2002), but revolutionary 
transitions have proved better for augmenting the 
quality of democracy. First, a peaceful and civil po-
litical culture can be brought about by widespread 
popular mobilization, collective protest and auton-
omous citizens’ actions (Roberts and Garton-Ash, 
2011; Della Porta, 2012). Revolutionary transitions 
tend be more peaceful than in the past, as in what 
Goodwin calls revolutionary reform social move-
ments (Goodwin, 2001, p. 10). It is not correct to ar-
gue that revolutions are inherently violent. If some 
revolutions or popular based transitions have been 
characterized by widespread violence (e.g. Roma-
nia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Philippines and South 
Africa), many others were peaceful (e.g. Portugal, 
Czech Republic, East Germany, Indonesia in 1998, 
Poland, and South Korea in 1987) (Bunce, 2002, 
pp. 70-76; Goodwin, 2001, p. 287; Teorell, 2010; 
p. 115; Thompson, 2004, p. 5; see also Weinstein, 
2007). Moreover, many pathways of democratiza-
tion through pacts, such as the Spanish, were more 
violent than many other mass-based transitions 
(Huntington, 1991, pp. 357-359). And in established 
democracies which went through non-revolution-
ary pathways to democracy, there was also wide-
spread use of violence by civil society actors (Della 
Porta, 1995). In this sense, the consolidation and 
stabilization of democracy, in so far as it depends 
on the creation of a peaceful and civic political cul-
ture, can best be fostered by transitions in which 
citizens and protest movements play a large role. 
 Secondly, research has also shown that so-
cial revolution is a pathway that leads to the creation 
of deeper democratic regimes and civil societies. 
This is noted by Anderson, who showed that social 
capital and civic engagement have been higher in 
post-revolutionary democracies, like Nicaragua 
(Anderson, 2010). In the same mold, Viterna and 
Fallon, argue that gender equality is advanced by 
transitions in which the masses are able to make 
a radical break with the institutions and culture of 
the dictatorship (Viterna and Fallon, 2008). Good-
win and Foran have suggested that democracies 
born out of revolution, as in the case of Nicaragua, 
have more progressive welfare states, land distribu-
tion, and educational policies (Foran and Goodwin, 
1993). For the Portuguese case specifically, Bermeo 
noted how agrarian cooperatives born of revolu-
ces papers - open forum # 17 9
tionary land occupations and controlled by the work-
ers became much more efficient than cooperatives 
which were not under workers’ control (Bermeo, 
1986, pp. 188 ff.). Finally, the path-breaking work of 
Robert Fishman has shown that its social revolution-
ary path from authoritarianism to democracy made 
Portugal a country where political equality is taken 
more seriously, elites are more open to the excluded 
and to popular interests and demands, and policies 
for the poor and working classes are more egalitar-
ian (employment, housing and labor market policies) 
(Fishman, 2010; Fishman, 2011, pp. 1– 2, 7–12).
 What is needed, then, is to establish a frame-
work that can capture the relationships between 
post-authoritarian democratization processes and 
the quality of subsequent democracies (on this topic 
see Della Porta, 2012). The many theories of con-
temporary democracy have focused on two aspects, 
which can be combined so as to come to a new un-
derstanding of the effects of democratization pro-
cesses. The first concerns the origins of democracy, 
namely, whether the transition processes are led by 
the masses – by popular actors from the civil society, 
through collective action and protest –, or whether 
the previous regime’s elites are the ones who de-
fine the terms and pace of the regime-change pro-
cess (Bendix, 1996; Collier, 1999; Dahl, 1971; Hig-
ley and Gunther, 1995; Markoff, 1996, pp. 22-26; 
Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Rustow, 1970; Ziblatt, 
2006). Although it has been established that democ-
racy may emerge both through pressures from below 
and from above, by elite initiatives, the impact of 
these two processes upon the quality of democracy 
is yet to be analyzed. If the essential principle of a 
high-quality democracy is that of political equality, 
then it is eminently reasonable to suppose that tran-
sitions in which the masses are the principal driver 
– not only through collective action, organized in po-
litical parties and associations, but through spontane-
ous movements, revolts, semi-organized resistance, 
and transgressive and illegal acts – lead to democra-
cies that are more sensitive and open to the interests 
of popular groups (Bernhard, 2012, p. 119; Bunce, 
2003, pp. 170-171; Collier, 1999, pp. 8-12, 16-
17; Stepan, 1986; Tilly, 2007, p. 24; Wood, 2001).
 From this standpoint, both old and recent 
processes of democratization present a great deal 
of variation. There is France, in 1944-46, where 
an alliance of disparate groups to resist the Ger-
man occupation, accompanied by the multipli-
cation of spontaneous popular revolts led to the 
creation of the Fourth Republic. But also the 
Portuguese revolution of 1974, as well as the de-
mocratization processes of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
the Philippines, South Korea, South Africa and 
El Salvador. In all of these cases, protest and the 
spontaneous or semi-organized mobilization of 
workers, students, religious groups, intellectuals 
and, in general, the middle classes made democ-
ratization inevitable (Schock, 2005; Thompson, 
2004, p. 5; Wood, 2001 and 2005, pp. 210-211).
 On the other hand, the path to democracy 
followed by Japan and Germany after WWII, by 
Colombia and Venezuela in the 1950s, and the 
more recent cases of Spain, Brazil, Greece, Argen-
tina, Chile, Uruguay, Poland, Hungary and Bul-
garia (Linz and Stepan, 1996), was initiated by the 
power elites in the previous non-democratic situ-
ation or regime. Such elites could either be mili-
tary or civilian, national or foreign (e.g., during 
periods of military occupation following a defeat, 
as in Japan or Germany after 1945). What really 
matters for the quality of the emerging democ-
racy is who controls the transition. Usually these 
elites will later call into negotiation the elites of 
the democratic oppositions. But deals and pacts 
with the opposition usually come at later stage.
 The second aspect, which is always pres-
ent in any democratization period, is the degree 
to which institutional changes are accompanied 
by changes that democratize the social and eco-
nomic realms. Pathways to democracy are not just 
about changes in political institutions (towards 
universal suffrage, free and fair elections, par-
liamentary control of government, accountabil-
ity mechanisms, rule of law, minority rights, and 
civic freedoms) (Dahl, 1971; Schmitter and Karl, 
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1996; Ziblatt, 2006) but are also about struggles over 
the distribution of material resources, symbols, and 
property. These struggles are democratic in the sense 
that they involve demands of change over the mate-
rial conditions of life and calls for a redistribution 
or more equitable access to economic (e.g. income, 
wealth, land) and other resources (e.g. education) to 
the common people and subordinate groups (Herz, 
1982 and Stepan, 1986, were the first to stress the 
importance of this dimension; more recent work in-
cludes Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; 
Karl, 1990; Markoff, 1996, pp. 3-4; Stephens, 1989; 
Ziblatt, 2008; Yashar, 1997). This is a decisive ele-
ment for the quality of democracy since, as recent 
research has shown, when structural inequality in 
resource distribution is very large, the institutional 
and formal rules of democratic competition are also 
negatively affected. For instance, a high concentra-
tion in land ownership is associated to high levels 
of electoral fraud and clientelism on the part of the 
elites – in other words, to a corruption of the dem-
ocratic spirit of the formal and purely political and 
institutional rules in themselves (Ziblatt, 2008 and 
2009). Measures of this type include land reform, 
industrial and workplace democracy, nationaliza-
tion and public control of industry, purges of old 
regime officials, the creation of universalistic wel-
fare policies (in pensions, subsidies, unemploy-
ment benefits, housing conditions) and education 
systems, corporatist policy-making and progressive 
taxation (Herz, 1982, pp. 283-284; Stepan, 1986; 
see also Fishman, 2010 and 2011; Heller, 1996, pp. 
2-8; Schock, 2005, p. 9; Stephens, 1979; Wood, 
2005, pp. 210-211; Yashar, 1997, pp. 103-105).
 Democracies have varied in this dimension as 
well. Some, like Portugal in 1974-1975, France and 
Japan after 1945, and Nicaragua in the 1970s, have 
been able to transform their socioeconomic struc-
tures in a more egalitarian fashion (Bermeo, 1999, 
pp. 124-126; Fishman, 2010; Fishman, 2011, pp. 1– 
2, 7–12; Foran and Goodwin, 1993; Stepan, 1986). 
Others have failed to do so, and kept intact highly 
inegalitarian patterns of land distribution and eco-
nomic concentration. The Philippines, South Korea,
Karl, 1990, p. 277; Kim, 2004; Schock, 2005, p. 9; 
Thompson, 2004, p. 5; Wood, 2005, pp. 210-211).
 Moreover, these two dimensions are inde-
pendent, and do not always trend the same. In fact, 
a new typology of pathways to democracy can be 
generated by cross-tabulating these two dimensions 
(Table 1). Some democratization processes led by 
elites have involved radical changes in economic 
structure (Japan after 1945), while others have not 
(Spain after 1977). And some mass based democrati-
zation processes have been accompanied by deep so-
cietal changes (Portugal 1974-75), while others have 
not (South Korea in the late 1980s and early 1990s).
 Reform is the pathway by which elites with-
in the previous non-democratic regime or situa-
tion start the transition (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 
56-65). The typical case is Spain after 1977. After 
Franco’s death in 1975, King Juan Carlos (head of 
state) and Adolfo Suarez (Prime-Minister), with the 
support of large segments of conservative and liber-
al factions within the regime, approved a law of po-
litical reform calling for free elections in 1977. At a 
later stage, communists and socialists were brought 
in to support this democratization process. But the 
consensus between the elites driving the transi-
tion was that only political reforms and changes 
would be implemented, not radical socioeconom-
ic transformations (Colomer, 1991, p. 1297; Linz 
and Stepan, 1996, p. 88; Fishman, 1990). Similar 
cases can be found in Taiwan (Higley, Huang, Lin, 
1998) or Bulgaria where, according to Linz and 
Stepan, the regime «initiated and never lost control 
of the transition» (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 333).
 When elites within the prior non-democrat-
ic regime or situation pilot a process of political, 
economic and social democratization, featuring 
profound socioeconomic changes in the direction 
of wider redistribution of resources, we call it, fol-
lowing the earlier path-breaking definition of Trim-
berger, revolution from above (Trimberger, 1978, p. 
2). Although Trimberger held that only non-demo-
cratic regimes emerged from this path, we argue that 
democratic Japan after 1945 is a case of democra-
tization through revolution from above: during the 
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period of American occupation, the restoration of civ-
il liberties, establishment of a constitutional monar-
chy, women’s equality and competitive elections was 
also accompanied by measures designed to improve 
the quality of democratic life by changing state and 
social structures. These included collective bargain-
ing, the banning of authoritarian right-wing parties, 
purges in the state administration, and nationalization 
of firms which had supported the war. But the major 
change was land reform, whereby ownership of land 
was democratized, both by placing legal limits to the 
amount of land a farmer could own and through forced 
expropriation (Smith, 1994, pp. 62-63, 154-160).
 The third pathway to democracy, following 
the work of Robert Fishman and Theda Skocpol, is 
social revolution: popular masses, whether semi-
organized or acting spontaneously, revolt against 
the political regime and, through collective action, 
propose changes designed to radically change, in an 
egalitarian direction, the social structures (Fishman, 
2011 and 2012; Skocpol, 1979). Portugal illustrates 
the clearest case: on April 25, 1974 a military coup or-
ganized by the left wing captain’s organization Mov-
imento das Forças Armadas - MFA (Armed Forces 
Movement) deposed the Estado Novo dictatorship 
(1933-1974). In its aftermath, a widespread wave of 
popular mobilization in all sectors of society pushed 
regime change not only in the direction of political 
democracy but also to democratize landowning pat-
terns, the state apparatus, companies in the industrial 
and financial sectors and schools. In interaction with 
the elites, but most of the time autonomously from 
them, popular movements introduced deep political 
and social change (Bermeo, 1986; Fishman, 2010 and 
2011; Maxwell, 1986; Pinto, 2001; Santos, 1992).
 Finally, rebellion is a pathway to democracy 
guided mostly by the spontaneous mobilization of 
people in the streets, by mass action against the po-
litical order, but which stops short of attempting sig-
nificant change in socioeconomic structures. Here, 
changes are circumscribed to political institutions and 
their leadership (Ekiert and Kubik, 1999; Hunting-
ton, 1996, p. 264; Wood, 2005). The clearest contem-
porary cases are South Korea and Czechoslovakia. In 
Korea, the regime was brought down in 1987 through 
pressure from a highly militant and oppositional civ-
il society, composed of a national alliance of social 
movements, students’ organizations, unions, and re-
ligious groups (Kim, 2004, p. 139). Likewise, in the 
Czech Republic, in the aftermath of the fall of the Ber-
lin wall, the transition to democracy was provoked by 
the spontaneous insurgency of common people in the 
streets through demonstrations and strikes (students, 
workers, public employees) and in partial coordina-
tion with opposition groups like the Civic Forum 
and Public against Violence (Bernhard, 1993; Glenn, 
2001; Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 111, 323-326).
Table 1: Pathways to Democracy
             Social                Social Revolution    Rev. from Above
            & Political        (Portugal)                 (Japan) 
 
Domains of                                             
Transformation
          Political              Rebellion                  Reform
                                       (S.Korea)                  (Spain)
                        Civil Society             Regime            
                        Center of Transformation
In the remainder of this article we compare how 
pathways to democracy by reform (Spain) and by 
social revolution (Portugal) had a varying impact 
on the quality of associational life in the subse-
quent democratic regimes. Specifically, in Portu-
gal the deep transformations in social and political 
structures implemented during the revolutionary 
period led, throughout the democratic regime, to 
a state-embedded, denser and empowered popu-
lar civil society. In Spain, by contrast, the pathway 
to democracy by reform led to a weak and disem-
powered popular and middle sectors’ civil society.
4. Democratization Pathways and Civil Society 
in Portugal and Spain, 1970s-2000s
4.1. Portugal
 Portugal’s route to democracy began on 
April 25, 1974, with a coup by a group of young 
left-wing middle-rank military officers, called the 
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Armed Forces Movement (MFA), who deposed 
the authoritarian New State regime. In effect, the 
structural reasons for the Portuguese revolution fit 
neatly into the general theories of revolution: an 
exclusionary and highly repressive regime, riddled 
with intense elite conflicts, which collapsed under 
severe military and financial pressures (on the Por-
tuguese case, the seminal work is Schmitter 1999c; 
see also Fernandes, 2007; on the causes of revolu-
tion see Goldstone, 2003, p. 82; Goodwin, 2001, 
pp. 47-49; Parsa, 2000, p. 11 and Skocpol, 1979)
 The reasons for the coup were at once po-
litical and professional. Not only were the profes-
sional officers unhappy with the fact that they could 
be overtaken in promotions by non-career officers, 
but they believed victory in the colonial war was 
impossible. A war with no end in sight, for which 
the regime had no solution, and professional griev-
ances combined to set off the 1974 coup (Maxwell, 
1986, p. 110). In its political program, presented 
soon after the coup, the MFA proposed the creation 
of a democracy in Portugal (Rezola, 2008, p. 62). 
 The coup led to the formation of a series of 
provisional governments, com composed of mili-
tary and representatives of all parties (including the 
communists), until the first free elections, in April, 
1975. But it also unleashed a wave of popular mo-
bilization and associational building unprecedented 
in Portuguese history, a wave of informal and as-
sociative movements concerned with introducing 
changes and democratizing every aspect of social 
life. According to Santos, in the wake of the Esta-
do Novo’s collapse, there was an «explosion of the 
widest and deepest popular social movement of the 
post-war period» (Santos, 1992, p. 27). Between 
April 1974 and the end of the following year, Portu-
gal went through what is called a social revolution. 
 A wide variety of associations and move-
ments appeared: political, parents’, youth, women’s, 
environmental, neighborhood, unions and workers’, 
cooperatives, farmers’, and professional (Branco 
and Fernandes, 2012, pp. 4-6; Graham and Wheeler, 
1983; Franco 2005, 13; Sousa 1994, 504–5; Eloy 
1994, 334, 343–44). In major urban centers, neigh-
of housing conditions and local level democracy. 
The first neighborhood movement was created on 
April 29, 1974, when some 100 families living in 
shacks in the Lisbon area occupied vacant houses. A 
month later, around 2,000 houses all over the main 
urban centers (Lisbon and Oporto) had been occu-
pied, and were run by elected neighborhood com-
missions (Ferreira and Pureza, 2002, pp. 107-109). 
 Leftist and center left students’ groups like 
the Pro-National Unity Commission of Portuguese 
Students and the Students’ Civic Service mobilized 
thousands of students during the summer of 1974 
for campaigns to promote literacy, health educa-
tion and community development for the poor rural 
and urban populations (Almeida, 2002, pp. 31-32; 
Oliveira, 2004). And in workplaces in general, be-
tween April and June of 1974, there was an enor-
mous wave of strikes and a movement for the occu-
pation of factories and the state apparatus. Through 
workers’ commissions, popular groups acquired 
institutional recognition and established a system 
of control over issues like employment and work-
ing conditions (Bermeo, 1986, p. 60; Muñoz, 2000). 
I n the countryside, historically an area of extreme 
land inequality (latifundia), oppression, poverty 
and clientelism, major peasant upsurges and land 
occupations occurred. Movements of landless 
workers occupied uncultivated lands and created 
collective farms run by cooperatives and unions 
(Barreto, 1987, p. 69). In 1975, union penetration 
in the southern latifundiary districts of Beja and 
Évora was up to circa 60 percent of the agricultur-
al labor force (Bermeo 1986, pp. 6, 44–46). In the 
North, small tenant farmers’ organizations formed 
the Farmer’s Movement (Movimento de Lavrador-
es, MOLA) (Lucena and Gaspar 1992, pp. 139–41).
 These movements promoted actions oriented 
towards the establishment of political democracy 
and the end of the dictatorship, but also the democ-
ratization of the state apparatus (bureaucracy in gen-
eral, the army, companies, schools, hospitals), and of 
social and economic life. As Muñoz documented in 
his analysis of workers’ movements and protest dur-
ing the transition, 57 percent of the collective actions 
and frames of the workers’ movement were utopian, 
transgressive and radical (illegal occupations of fac-
tories and companies) (Muñoz, 2000, p. 142). Also, 
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as Pinto showed, these movements were able to pro-
mote an extensive purge of the dictatorships’ officials 
in the armed forces, local administration, the police, 
and civil service (Pinto, 2001). In sum, in the words 
of Kenneth Maxwell, popular social movements 
were able to eliminate the «old mechanisms of def-
erence and social control» (Maxwell, 1986, p. 124). 
 Elites in the newly-founded parties and the 
military had mixed reactions to popular mobiliza-
tion. The Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Co-
munista Português, PCP) and its closest union con-
federation, the General Confederation of Portuguese 
Workers (Confederação Geral de Trabalhadores Por-
tugueses, CGTP), condemned the strikes; and there 
were some attempts by parts of the military to repress 
strikes. But soon these organizations connected with 
and opened up to popular mobilization, developing 
strong organizational direct and indirect links with 
the masses (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 54). 
Moreover, what emerged from the process was a 
general positive consensus about the revolution and 
towards ideals of equality and participatory democ-
racy. All parties and movements, irrespective of other 
ideological differences, rejected the old regime and 
presented themselves as revolutionary. Antifascism 
and consensus about the creation of a participatory 
and socialist democracy became the ideological ce-
ment uniting all the new political and popular forces, 
both military and civilian (Rezola, 2008, pp. 296-
306; on the role of antifascist ideology in the post-
1945 democratic transitions see Linz, 1998, p. 34)
 The military were the first agent of popular 
mobilization, thorough the MFA, creating units at 
the level of prefectures for the purpose of civic mo-
bilization, indoctrination and deep societal transfor-
mation (Cerezales, 2003, p. 60; Maxwell, 1986, p. 124; 
Santos, 1992, pp. 60-63). The MFA’s Program for Cul-
tural Activism and Political Enlightenment became 
the ideological basis of several military-popular civic 
mobilization campaigns. Aiming to achieve «ample 
participation of the people in the life of the nation» 
through the national coordination of schools, local 
communities, squatter movements and «all cultural 
associations of the country», its objective was to go be-
yond simple electoral democracy and to create a par-
ticipatory and egalitarian democracy (Almeida, 2002, 
p. 32; Correia, Soldado, and Marujo, n.d., pp. 17-18). 
 The MFA gradually evolved from a civic 
organization at the start of the transition to a rev-
olutionary movement, under the banner Aliança 
Povo–MFA (MFA-People’s alliance). It started by 
protecting and supporting peasants in the occupied 
lands and other poor people’s movements. Be-
tween March and November of 1975, it strength-
ened its links to the PCP, creating the Council of 
the Revolution (Conselho da Revolução), a revo-
lutionary committee which, in practice, ruled the 
country until November 1975 (Downs, 1983, p. 10)
 The left and center parties also mobilized 
and created links with mass-based popular move-
ments. The union movement became unitary under 
the CGTP, the single union confederation. With re-
sources and support from the Ministry of Labor dur-
ing the first provisional governments, it was able to 
expand throughout the country and include the more 
spontaneous workers’ commissions and new unions 
that were being created (Barreto, 2005, pp. 253-256; 
see also Logan, 1983). By 1975, it covered at least 
50 percent of the labor force (Bermeo, 1986, 60).
 The newly-formed parties of the center and 
center-right also supported the revolution, adopting 
ideologies and outlooks that were far to the left of 
their counterparts abroad. The larger of these parties 
clearly rejected the dictatorship’s legacy, calling it-
self Partido Social Democrata (PSD, Social Demo-
cratic Party). The PSD also became a mass party, 
with a structure encompassing the entire country 
and with close links to grassroots organizations 
(youth, women’s). In the mid-1970s, in concert 
with the socialists, it created a new national union 
confederation, the UGT – União Geral de Trabalha-
dores (Morlino, 1998, p. 196). Even traditionalist 
and conservative institutions, such as the Church, 
accepted revolutionary objectives: some priests and 
bishops supported parties like the PSD and the So-
cialists, while others aligned with the extreme left; 
but all held as priorities of their public agenda issues 
like social inequality and unemployment (Ham-
man and Manuel, 1999; Morlino, 1998, p. 163).
 As a result of this extreme mobilization 
linking elites and civil society during the revolu-
tionary period, Portuguese civil society organiza-
tions became much more robust and came to play 
a much more important role in politics than their 
Spanish counterparts. In Portugal, it became com-
mon for  agricultural and union organizations to be 
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Moreover, because it was possible for mass action of 
popular civil society organizations during the transi-
tion to mold the state and society in a clearly radical 
and egalitarian direction, it was easier for these asso-
ciations to become embedded in the new state regu-
lations and networks of policy-making. Housing was 
recognized as a social right in the constitution and 
shanty-town and neighborhood associations received 
state recognition as participants of local democratic 
governance. With the creation of the public support 
programmes for poor neighborhoods during the revo-
lution, neighborhood organizations were grouped in 
regional and city-wide commissions which worked 
with the authorities in the definition of budgetary pri-
orities and in the implementation of policies related 
to housing, water distribution, sewerage, transporta-
tion, medical and childcare support (Downs, 1983; 
Portas and Gago, 1980, p. 238, Pinto, 2008, pp. 4-5; 
Cerezales, 2003, p. 104; Rodrigues and Stoer, 2000, 
pp. 51-52). But also in the fields of urban planning 
and environment, consultation with citizens’ orga-
nizations became mandatory. In Lisbon alone, civil 
society associations were consulted in 78 percent of 
these policy initiatives (Mota, 2005, pp. 117-188). 
 In the countryside, the law of agrarian reform 
which ended the regime of latifundia in the south 
was approved on July 29, 1975 with the support of 
all major parties, except the small, right-wing So-
cial and Democratic Center (Centro Democrático 
e Social, CDS. The area under the law covered 40 
percent of the national territory; it would be man-
aged in partnership between the State (through lo-
cal centers of agrarian reform) and organizations 
representing the interests of landless workers and 
small producers, called Collective Production Units 
(Unidades Colectivas de Produção, or UCPs). These 
were responsible for the allocation of public credit 
and technical support to farmers, whereas unions 
were mandated to negotiate salaries, work condi-
tions and subsidies with local state authorities and 
employers (Barreto, 1987, pp. 46-49, 69). Later on, 
in December 1976, local cooperatives and unions 
were reunited within a single state institution respon-
sible for overseeing the cooperative sector (the In-
stituto Nacional do Sector Cooperativo, INSCOOP) 
and also given a role in the negotiation and alloca-
tion of credit, social security financing, and taxation 
(Barreto, 1987, p. 42; Bermeo, 1983, pp. 186-189).
in tune with partisan goals (Morlino, 1998, pp. 231) 
and for parties – both right and left – to rely upon 
civil society for purposes of electoral mobilization 
(development, housing, and professional organi-
zations are particularly important) and policy and 
law-making (Cruz 1988, 109–19; Jalali, Silva and 
Silva, 2012, p. 69). At the level of contemporary 
mass attitudes Viegas and Santos also found that 
membership in associations in Portugal (especially 
unions, professional and recreational associations) 
is strongly influenced by party identification (Vie-
gas and Santos, 2010, p. 135). Parties themselves 
became much stronger and more mobilizing than 
in Spain. Electoral turnout has been much higher 
in Portugal: in the mid-1970s it was 91 percent in 
Portugal (1975) and 76 percent in Spain (1977). 
Finally, levels of party identification and member-
ship became also higher in Portugal. In 1989, only 
30 percent of the adult population in Spain identi-
fied with a party; in Portugal 49 percent did (Gun-
ther and Montero 2001, 92; Morlino, 1998, p. 169). 
 Wider popular mobilization and stronger 
elite-mass linkages during the transition also pro-
moted more open institutions and laws, which in 
turn empowered civil society associations through-
out the democratic period. The new legislation on 
freedom of association was very tolerant, the only 
restrictions being for associations that promoted 
violent acts or that espoused a fascist ideology. Ad-
ministrative restrictions, and the possibility of gov-
ernment discretionary intervention in associational 
life (through the granting of licenses or juridical 
recognition that it serves the collective interest), 
which existed in the Spanish case, were suppressed 
(Mendes, 2008, pp. 30-31). Moreover, highly com-
petitive, mass-based and left-oriented parties stimu-
lated not only the creation of a powerful parliament, 
but also of one in which associations were consult-
ed in law-making. Parliamentary reforms since the 
transition have strengthened the role of civil soci-
ety organizations and citizens’ initiatives. Petitions 
originating from citizens’ movements only required 
one thousand signatures to be discussed in parlia-
ment. And it has been common practice for the par-
liament to call representatives of civil society to set-
tle disputes and promote agreements. It is no wonder 
then that the number of petitions directed to parlia-
ment has grown (Leston-Bandeira, 2002, 150-154).
 
ces papers - open forum # 17 15
 
Unions and workers’ representative organizations 
were also inserted in policy partnerships with 
the state at the national level. Collective dismiss-
als required the approval of the Ministry of La-
bor and consultations with the workers’ unions 
(Garcia and Karakatsanis 2006, pp. 93-94). And 
the widespread sectoral, enterprise and frame 
agreements and bargaining between the state, the 
unions and the employers during the revolution, 
especially in the nationalized companies, became 
the framework through which national level cor-
poratism was established in 1983 (Etchemendy, 
2011, pp. 8-9, 15-16; Stoleroff, 1990). This na-
tional level body, rebaptized Social and Eco-
nomic Council (Conselho Económico e Social, 
CES) in 1992, had equal representation of labor 
and capital. It dealt with labor, employment and 
economic policy-making, and although complete 
consensus has not been always the norm, antago-
nism was not widespread either (Mozzicafreddo, 
1997, p. 78). The communist dominated CGTP 
signed most sectoral agreements and only fully 
opposed some of the national level agreements 
(Lucena and Gaspar, 1991, 876–78; Morlino, 
1998, pp. 232-233, 277). Finally, the CES extend-
ed its competences to social policy, by including 
representatives of environmental and social wel-
fare organizations (Mozzicafreddo, 1997, p. 78). 
 Since 1975, state local health services were 
expanded but also democratized, by allowing  rep-
resentatives of workers’ and of local populations 
to take part in their management (Santos, 1992, p. 
217). And religious associations and social wel-
fare federations, like the União das Misericórias 
Portuguesas, were recognized as government part-
ners for the definition and delivery of universal-
istic or quasi-universalistic social policies in the 
fields of health, welfare, education, and housing 
(Hespanha et al., 2000, pp. 134-136). Accordingly, 
the State has financially supported these associa-
tions. And, in fact, state funding of the activities 
and services of these institutions is also higher in 
Portugal than in Spain (Franco et al., 2012, p. 27). 
Since 1975, state local health services were expanded 
but also democratized, by allowing  representatives of 
workers’ and of local populations to take part in their 
management (Santos, 1992, p. 217). And religious 
associations and social welfare federations, like the 
União das Misericórias Portuguesas, were recognized 
as government partners for the definition and delivery 
of universalistic or quasi-universalistic social poli-
cies in the fields of health, welfare, education, and 
housing (Hespanha et al., 2000, pp. 134-136). Ac-
cordingly, the State has financially supported these 
associations. And, in fact, state funding of the activi-
ties and services of these institutions is also higher 
in Portugal than in Spain (Franco et al., 2012, p. 27). 
4.1. Spain
 Spain’s pathway to democracy was very dif-
ferent from Portugal’s. After the killing of PM Carre-
ro Blanco in 1973 by the Basque nationalist organi-
zation ETA, the regime went into a crisis, alternating 
between cycles of liberalization (e.g. the more open 
statute of political associations, in the subsequent 
government of Arias Navarro) and repression by 
Franco’s core hardliners. Although during this pe-
riod civil society mobilization against the dictator-
ship was quite high (in 1974 alone, strikes grew 62 
percent), the government was always in control of 
the pace of reforms. Only when Franco died, in No-
vember 1975, did the new head of State, King Juan 
Carlos, supported by reformists and technocrats in 
the regime declare himself in favor of a transition 
to democracy. Together with Adolfo Suárez, who 
replaced Arias Navarro as head of the government 
in July 1976, they dismantled Franco’s single party, 
issued amnesties to political prisoners, and presided 
over the first free elections. Juan Carlos’s greater 
control over the assembly made it possible to ap-
prove a law of political reform (October 1976), in 
which the assembly dissolved itself, thus clearing 
the way for democracy. It was only after this series 
of negotiations between the factions of the regime 
that Suarez and the King turned to the left and the 
democratic opposition. A series of negotiations in 
1977 made possible the first free elections, won by 
Suarez’ party, the UCD (Colomer, 1991; Fernandes, 
2007, pp. 698–99; Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 87-
114; Maravall and Santamaría, 1986, pp. 79-80)
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Technocrats were empowered within parties and 
governing teams, both in the right-wing UCD and 
the leftist PSOE (Gunther 1996, p. 15; Linz, 1975, 
pp. 266–73; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 46–
47; Tarrow, 1995, pp. 219–21). Unlike in Portugal, 
policy-making was guided by the notions of auster-
ity, budget control, and low salaries, inflation and 
public investment (Maravall and Santamaría, 1986, 
p. 86; Pérez-Díaz, 1996, pp. 49-50). This explains 
also why in Portugal, despite the fact that it is poorer 
and economically less developed, there has been a 
greater effort to create an egalitarian welfare state. 
For instance, expenses in education, health and social 
security as percentage of the GDP amounted, in the 
2000s, to 26.9 percent in Portugal and 21.8 percent 
in Spain, although in the early 1970s, during the last 
years of the dictatorship, Spain invested more in wel-
fare measures (Huber and Stephens, 2012, p. 209).
 Institutionally, this policy-making style was 
supported by a very strong executive. Executive 
dominance has been much higher in Spain than in 
Portugal. The parliament had no authority to re-
move or to give votes of no confidence to particu-
lar members of the government. There have always 
been more laws from the government than from 
parliament, in contrast to Portugal. And policy pri-
orities were defined mainly by the prime minis-
ter’s inner core (Gunther 1996, 68–69; Gunther, 
Montero, Botella, 2004, p. 117; Morlino, 1998, pp. 
64-65; Van Biezen, Hopkin, 2005, pp. 107-109). 
 Weak parliamentarization inhibited the de-
velopment of regular and institutionalized links be-
tween parties and civil society, weakening, in the 
long run, both parties and voluntary associations. 
Political parties favored the mobilization of the 
electorate through personalistic and populist strate-
gies, rather than ideological claims and grass-roots 
activation (Gunther, Montero, Botella, 2004, p. 95; 
Van Biezen, Hopkin, 2005, pp. 110-112). The com-
munists had weak links to unions. The communist 
union, the Workers’ Comissions (Comisiones Obre-
ras, CC.OO), always maintained its autonomy from 
the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de 
España, PCE) (Fishman 1989, p. 19). And although, 
in 1986, the PCE formed the Izquierda Unida (United 
Left), an electoral front with other left groups and 
new social movements, it has always remained a very 
weak organization (Morlino, 1998, pp. 186-193). On 
the center-right, the UCD was unable to develop a 
 Spain’s pathway to democracy was not only 
guided from above, it was mainly oriented towards 
basic institutional and political change. The elites 
simply had no plan for altering the basic social and 
economic structures of society; nor was there any op-
portunity to be taken by popular sector civil society 
organizations. In order for the transition to be viable, 
Suarez had to convince the political and economic 
elites of the dictatorship that that they would be able 
to prosper in the new regime. The project of political 
reform was accepted only after the deputies (many 
of whom would be re-elected in the first free general 
elections in 1977) received guarantees of continuity 
and a general amnesty was extended to the officials 
of the dictatorship (Aguilar, 2001; Maravall and San-
tamaría, 1986, p. 83). At the levels of local politics, 
public administration, State schools, army, police, 
and the judiciary, the personnel of the dictatorship 
were left intact (Malefakis, 1982, p. 216). The eco-
nomic elites, too, were reassured that the basic con-
tours of the existing capitalist system would remain 
unchanged (Maravall and Santamaría, 1986, p. 83).
 In the Moncloa pacts of 1977, the left (includ-
ing the PCE and the PSOE) was forced, in order to be 
accepted in the new regime, to abandon many goals 
(among which, nationalization, the end of religious 
private education, and agrarian reform) and to cut its 
ties to popular social movements (Gunther, Montero, 
Botella, 2004, pp. 95, 239-241; Maravall and Santa-
maría, 1986, pp. 84-80). This inhibited the possibil-
ity for a mass civil society to develop in Spain. For 
instance, the urban neighborhood movements, which 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s were considered the 
largest of Western Europe, demobilized within a few 
years, mainly because the parties with which they 
were most connected (PSOE and PCE) demanded, in 
order to appease the right, that they tone down their 
radical and participatory demands (Castells, 1983, 
pp. 215, 261). In Madrid, by 1979 the PCE-PSOE 
coalition had depoliticized the movement and im-
posed a form of urban governance with almost no 
participation of neighborhood associations (Castells, 
1983, pp. 224, 273-274; Hipscher, 1996, p. 291). 
 Moreover, this pathway of democratization 
reinforced a political culture within the elite in which 
technical depoliticization and traditionalistic values 
(e.g. deference towards authority and the monarchy) 
were combined (McDonough, Pina, Barnes, 1981, p. 
54; McDonough, Pina, Barnes, 1984, pp. 659-660). 
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modern party with a unitary organization through-
out the territory, and disintegrated after bitter 
factional struggles. The UCD became little more 
than a collection of personalities, unable to de-
velop permanent links to societal organizations 
and interests, such as the church, Catholic peas-
ants, and business interests. In 1982 the party split, 
with many joining the socialists and the more 
conservative going to smaller right-wing parties 
Popular Aliance (Alianza Popular) and the So-
cial and Democratic Center (Centro Democrati-
co y Social, CDS) (Pappas, 2001, pp. 250–251). 
 On the center-left, the PSOE became an 
electoral-professional party run by a small oli-
garchy, also unable to create ties with the work-
ers’ movement. This was even more paradoxical, 
since, historically, the Spanish socialists had had 
closer ties to the workers’ movement (through the 
General Union of Workers or Unión General de 
Trabajadores-UGT) than the Portuguese social-
ists ever did. In the first years of the transition, 
the party statutes even required that PSOE mem-
bers join the UGT. Still, the party as an organiza-
tion became weak. It had very few members, and 
party functionaries and elected officials predomi-
nated over union leaders in the party’s internal 
power struggles. Members of the UGT’s national 
executive attended party congresses as guests, 
with no voting rights (Fishman, 1989 and 1990b).
 Although the Federation of Rural Work-
ers (Federación de Trabajadores de la Tierra, 
FTT-UGT) and the Unions of Rural Workers 
(Sindicatos de Obreros Agrícolas, SOAs), the 
rural workers’ federations of the 1930s, were re-
vitalized by the PSOE in 1977, they did not con-
solidate and expand as organizations. After 1982, 
the PSOE even allowed its militants to affiliate 
with the Unions of farmers and Cattle Breeders 
(Uniones de Agricultores y Ganaderos, UAGAs), 
which were actually closer to being organiza-
tions of landowners (Estrada 1984, 216). Since 
then, the PSOE has had better relationships with 
elite and employer organizations than with popu-
lar class groups (Morlino, 1998, pp. 229-231). 
 Social and economic policy-making be-
came mainly the domain of direct state interven-
tion and not consultative corporatist institutions, as 
in Portugal (Estrada 1984, 124). Although Spain 
was known for its transición pactada (pacted tran-
sition), on account of the series of agreements be-
tween October 1977 (the Pactos de la Moncloa) 
and the spring of 1981 (Acuerdo Nacional de 
Empleo, ANE – the National Employment Agree-
ment), these pacts were mainly the work of po-
litical parties and never become institutionalized 
(Fishman, 1990b, pp. 215-217). An incomes policy 
agreement was achieved, but unions and employ-
ers’ organizations did not participate directly in the 
negotiations. The national leaders of the unions 
voted on these policies in parliament as mem-
bers of that body, rather than deal directly with 
the government (Hamann and Lucio, 2003, p. 63). 
 During the democratic period, unions usu-
ally were not consulted and had no impact on 
policy decisions (Gunther, 1996, pp. 68–69; Pérez-
Díaz, 1999, p. 35). The main body for corporat-
ist negotiation, the Economic and Social Council 
(Consejo Económico y Social, CES), was created 
in 1992 to promote cooperation among unions, 
business, and the government. But the CES could 
not “take binding decisions and its discussions” 
were “fundamentally different from the nego-
tiation of the global pacts up to 1986” (Wozniak, 
1991, p. 9). Unions, in particular, have been nega-
tively affected by this, because in the absence of 
state support and encouragement, there are few 
incentives by which members could be recruited. 
Contrary to Portugal, most unions were unable to 
give their members such services as health plans, 
housing, and pension schemes (Hamann, 1998, pp. 
430–35; on Portugal see Morlino, 1995, pp. 357–
58 and Royo, 2002, pp. 152–53). Also, labor laws 
in Spain undermined the power of unions, since 
they made it easier to dismiss workers, whereas, 
in Portugal, employment could only be terminat-
ed by mutual consent, when a contract ended, or 
when there was just cause (Hamann, 1998, p. 430).
 Related to the fact that there was hard-
ly any recognition of voluntary associations as 
policy partners, few associations have achieved 
public status in Democratic Spain (Pérez-Díaz 
and Novo, 2003, pp. 110–12). State funding of 
welfare activities of third sector associations is 
lower than in Portugal (32 percent and 40 per-
cent, respectively) (Franco, 2012, p. 21). In 1987, 
there were only twenty associations with public 
status; in 1988, twenty three; and, between 1993 
and 1997, 157 (Mota, 1999, 58). Whatever fund-
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ing existed, scholars agree that it was discretionary 
and episodic, and not based on universal and open 
criteria (Estrada, 1984, pp. 286 ff. and 322, 324). 
 Instead, associations developed clientelistic 
relationships with the State and the party in govern-
ment. This tended to benefit mainly elite organiza-
tions. Employers and agrarian groups have kept a 
‘family relationship’ with the public sector or per-
sonal links with deputies and ministers (Estrada, 
1984, pp. 286 ff. and 322, 324; Gunther, 1996, pp. 
68–69; Pérez-Díaz, 1999, p. 35). But after the tran-
sition there was also the consolidation of networks 
of mass clientelism. In the Southern region of An-
dalucía, Spanish socialists used rural unemployment 
benefits, channeled through the party machine and 
the UGT local branches, to exchange for elector-
al support. These benefits had been created during 
Francoism, and used by municipalities to fund pub-
lic works to employ rural workers. But democratic 
governments expanded them to avoid rebellion in the 
south, first, during the transition, through unemploy-
ment commissions with union presence and later, af-
ter 1982, through local party officials and employers. 
 Although between the late 1970s and mid-
1980s a peasants’ movement for agrarian reform 
emerged, organized by the agrarian wings of the 
FTT and CCOO as well as by the Union of Rural 
Workers (Sindicato de Obreros del Campo, SOC), 
and with ties to the recently-formed regionalist An-
dalucian Labor Party, it achieved only some media 
attention. Land occupations were very few, and the 
amount of land and material benefits given to ru-
ral workers was considered a failure (Herrera and 
Markoff, 2011, pp. 465, 468). This has prevented 
the development of modern cooperatives and rural 
workers’ associations in Southern Spain (Watson, 
2008; Robles-Egea and Aceituno-Nunes, 2012).
 Finally, Spanish civil society was further dis-
empowered because many of the old legal restrictions 
of the dictatorship’s legislation of freedom of associa-
tion continued during democracy. Although the 1978 
constitution consecrated the principle of freedom of 
association, it maintained the requirement of a de-
claración de utilidade pública (declaration of public 
utility), granted through very discretionary mecha-
nisms; this depended on the council of ministers, 
and it was reserved only for associations that were 
deemed to promote welfare, education, culture, and 
sports. Not only did these legal criteria exclude po
litical or professional associations, they also allowed 
the State to dissolve associations if the authorities 
considered their aims or the actions of their members 
(even when not acting during organization’s activi-
ties) to be a criminal «offense» (delito). As this was 
not clearly typified in the law, this legislation was then 
frequently used by the Spanish authorities to forbid 
associations or demonstrations that might be critical 
of the government of the day (Pérez-Díaz and Novo 
2003, p. 109; Rivacoba and Tartière, 2004, pp. 14-17).
5. Conclusion 
 This article presented a new argument con-
cerning the origins and types of civil societies in 
post-authoritarian democracies. We have argued that 
those democracies that are born of social revolution 
have a denser, more participative and egalitarian civ-
il society than those of democracies that come out 
of a pathway of reform. Unlike other scholars, such 
as Jack Goldstone (2001, p. 169), we have found 
strong evidence that social revolution contributes to 
the quality of democracy, in so far as it promotes the 
consolidation and institutionalization of civic orga-
nizations representing the popular and middle sec-
tors. Furthermore, we have found strong empirical 
support for questioning theorizations which hold 
that social revolutions lead to democracies that are 
weakly consolidated, either because the moderates 
are defeated by the radicals, or because the revolu-
tionary goals of economic and social transformation 
are incompatible with the construction of a political 
democracy, based on elections and parliaments (Di 
Palma, 1990, pp. 68-70; Karl, 1990, p. 278; Karl and 
Schmitter, 1991, p. 274; Shain and Linz, 1995, p. 
21). The Portuguese case falsifies those assertions, 
since radical social and economic transformations 
toward greater democratization were undertaken 
simultaneously with political democratization, i.e., 
while strengthening the power and centrality of par-
liaments and elections. Moreover, in so far as it is 
essential for democratic consolidation that there be 
mass organizations (associations and parties) that 
will serve as channels of communications between 
masses and elites, provide clear ideological alterna-
tives, and serve as agencies for the socialization of 
values, mobilization and participation, (Hagopian, 
1990, pp. 163-165; Mainwaring, 1999), then the Por-
tuguese case shows higher quality and better con-
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ties, which greatly impedes popular access to the 
institutions responsible for public policies (Cotton, 
1997, p. 98). And the parliamentary committees in 
charge of elaborating public policies in areas such as 
commerce, industrial relations, health and welfare al-
ways ignored civil society organizations (Kim, 2004, 
pp. 150-151). In South Korea, the transition placed 
social movements and voluntary organizations at 
the center of politics. But their relationship with 
the parties and the state is hostile and conflictual.
 The pathway of revolution from above, ex-
emplified by Japan after 1945, engendered a dense 
and participatory civil society during the democratic 
period (Tiedemann, 1982, p. 204). However, very 
rarely do civic movements of a national scale, such 
as those in South Korea or Portugal, emerge; groups 
tend to be small and local. Although institutional-
ized, supported by the political parties and embed-
ded in the welfare system, Japanese civil society 
presented a relatively limited and conservative num-
ber of views (Pekannen, 2004, p. 224; Pharr, 2000, 
p. 190). The issue here is not so much violence as 
the alienation of a part of the regime’s citizens, since 
many voices and interests are excluded from the 
highly conservative dominant values (Õtake, 2000).
 Once again, this type of civil society is a 
product of the pathway to democracy. The process 
of revolution from above created a new rural mid-
dle class, made up of family farmers who, thanks to 
land reform, had more resources for economic activ-
ity and for collective associational action, strongly 
linked to the dominant party the Liberal Democrats. 
However, this was not done under the aegis of an 
egalitarian and emancipating ideology, but under 
that of conservative, anti-leftist values (Krauss and 
Pekkanen, 2011, p. 14; Pharr, 2000, pp. 190-193). 
 Finally, there is a new set of questions 
raised by this inquiry. How can one explain each 
country’s choice of pathway to democracy? How 
long do the legacies of the transition context en-
dure? What other legacies or factors might gradu-
ally dilute the impact of the pathway to democracy 
taken by each society? Is the typology we sketched 
valid for other historical periods of democratiza-
tion (e.g. interwar Europe), or does it only hold 
for post-authoritarian democracies? And, for the 
post-authoritarian democracies as a whole, is this 
solidation than the Spanish. It is here – and not in 
Spain – that we find there is greater party identifica-
tion, mass parties and higher electoral participation. 
 What are the consequences for the quality 
of democracy of the remaining two pathways to de-
mocracy, rebellion and revolution from above? We 
cannot provide, in these pages, an in-depth com-
parative study of these other cases, but we believe 
there is data suggesting that the pathway of social 
revolution also leads to more egalitarian democra-
cies than the pathways of rebellion and revolution 
from above. However, these two pathways also leave 
specific dilemmas for the subsequent democracies. 
 In South Korea, we see how a pathway to de-
mocracy through rebellion in 1988 led to a civil soci-
ety with a strong presence in the public arena, able to 
make strides towards greater equality. In this country, 
there is an immense variety of civic groups, which 
tend not only to form movements on the national 
scale (e.g. unions, religious, consumers’, women’s’, 
farmers’, and teachers’ groups) but also collective 
platforms in which different groups and social inter-
ests combine to call for democratizing transforma-
tions in the system (Kim, 2004, pp. 148-149). The 
actions of such coalitions have resulted in the trials 
of former presidents of the authoritarian period and 
in promoting the creation of an egalitarian welfare-
state, through the establishment of a basic income and 
the enactment of universalistic measures in pensions 
and healthcare. Moreover, these campaigns have im-
bued the population with strong feelings of political 
efficacy (Kim, 2004, p. 150; Lee, 2012, pp. 28-32).
 At the same time, this is a highly confronta-
tional and often violent civil society in its relations 
with the authorities (Kim, 2004, p. 152). This is due 
to the fact that democratization did not affect the eco-
nomic sphere or the state’s structures. The economy, 
the parties and the state were left in the hands of the 
old elites, rather than democratized. The campaigns 
to reform the economy, in which industrial compa-
nies are concentrated in the hands of a small nucleus 
of families (the so-called chaebol) came to naught. 
As Kim notes there was no «progress in economic 
democratization» (Kim, 2004, p. 157). Parties, too, 
remained clientelistic, regional-based organizations, 
very much based upon the elite of the previous dic-
tatorship, and, especially, dependent on and financed 
by the powerful chaebol (Lee, 2012, p. 40). Unions 
were forbidden by law to fund and support the par-
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the most appropriate typology for the analysis of 
democratization processes in the context of high-
ly inegalitarian societies, as historically found in 
Southern Europe, Latin America and Asia, or can 
it fruitfully be applied to the new democracies of 
Eastern Europe, where levels of social inequal-
ity have historically been lower? Finally, what is 
the relationship between consolidation and qual-
ity of democracy? These two processes have been 
treated separately, but our study seems to indicate 
that the causes of democratic consolidation and 
quality are the same. Accordingly, those democ-
racies in which the principle of political equality 
is weaker tend also to find it more difficult to de-
velop the organizations and institutions required 
for democratic consolidation. These are questions 
which must now be addressed in work to come.
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endnotes
1. In other democratic regimes a similar pattern can be observed. In Eastern Europe, according to Bern-
hard, civil society was strong both before and after the transition in Poland; weak before the transition, 
but then strong after in Czechoslovakia; and, in Hungary, weak before and after the transition. Alfred 
Stepan makes a similar argument for Latin America. See Bernhard, 1993 and Stepan, 1997.
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